

# Contents

<b>Acknowledgements.....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Introduction: Main Goal, Research Question, Relevance and Structure of the Study .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>I. Theoretical Part .....</b>	<b>21</b>
1. Literature Review .....	21
1.1 Overview of Research on Integration in the Post-Soviet Region.....	21
1.2 Literature on Authoritarian Regimes.....	30
2. In Search of a Theoretical Framework of Analysis: R. Putnam’s Two-Level Games Approach.....	34
2.1 The Dominance of Realism .....	34
2.2 Interdependence Theory.....	35
2.3 Theories of Regional Integration .....	36
2.4 Nexus of Internal-External Determinants in Foreign Policy Analysis.....	38
3. Putnam’s Two-Level Game Approach.....	39
3.1 Characteristics and Assumptions of Putnam’s Approach .....	40
3.2 Application of the Two-Level Game Approach in the Academic Literature.....	41
3.3 Critique of Putnam’s Approach .....	43
4. Application of Putnam’s Approach to Integration Games in the Eastern Neighbourhood: Towards a Comprehensive Typology of Independent Variables .....	46
<b>II. Research Design.....</b>	<b>57</b>
5. Ontological and Epistemological Foundations .....	57
6. Case Study Methodology and Case Selection .....	58

7. Towards a Clearer Conceptualization and Operationalization of the Independent and Dependent Variables .....	63
7.1 Defining and Operationalizing the Explanandum of the Research .....	63
7.2 Integration Offer .....	66
7.3 Independent Variables .....	68
8. Data Collection .....	71
<b>III. Empirical Part .....</b>	<b>77</b>
9. Belarus' Integration Policy: Caught Between Domestic Interests, Russia and the EU .....	77
9.1 International Factors Influencing Belarus' Integration Stance .....	77
9.1.1 <i>Costs and Benefits ("Attractiveness") of Integration Offers to Belarus</i> .....	77
a. Attractiveness of Russia's Integration Offer for Belarus ..	79
b. Attractiveness of EU's Integration Offer for Belarus .....	88
9.1.2 <i>Economic Linkages Between Belarus and External Actors (Trade Flows and Direct Financial Support)</i> .....	92
a. Belarus-Russia Economic Linkages.....	93
b. Belarus-EU Economic Linkages.....	98
9.2 Domestic Factors Influencing Belarus' Integration Stance .....	101
9.2.1 <i>Level-II Political Institutions and Ratification Procedures of International Treaties in Belarus</i> .....	101
9.2.2 <i>Level-II Political Preferences and Coalitions</i> .....	103
a. Formation and Development of Belarusian Nomenklatura in 1994–2015.....	103
b. Geopolitical Preferences of Deputies in the Belarusian Parliament.....	106
c. Belarusian Opposition .....	111
d. Outside businessmen (regime-linked business elites) and their influence on politics in Belarus.....	115
e. Geopolitical Preferences of Belarusians.....	119
9.2.3 <i>Level-I Negotiator and His Strategies (Mechanisms of Elite Co-Optation and Control)</i> .....	122

9.3	Analysis of the Integration Game in Belarus Vis-à-Vis the EU and Russia in 1994–2015 .....	128
9.3.1	<i>First Presidential Term (1994–2001): Russian Integration Euphoria and the Freezing of Relations with the EU</i> .....	128
	a. Formation and Development of Belarus’ Win-Set .....	128
	b. Belarus-Russia Integration Game: Quick Start – Mixed Results .....	130
	c. Belarus-EU Integration (No) Game .....	133
9.3.2	<i>Second Presidential Term (2001–2006): Dismantling the Integration Myth and Switching to Economic Pragmatism</i> .....	134
	a. Consolidation of a Homogeneous Win-Set and Further Strengthening of an Acceptability Set of the President ....	135
	b. Belarus-Russia Altered Integration Game: A Pragmatic Twist.....	136
	c. Belarus-EU Integration Game: Who Against Whom? ..	140
9.3.3	<i>Third Presidential Term (2006–2010): Further Marketization of Relations and Integration in the Framework of Economic Pragmatism</i> .....	141
	a. Complete “Subordination” of Belarus’ Win-Set to President’s Acceptability Set.....	141
	b. Belarus-Russia Integration Game as “Sovereignty Entrepreneurship” .....	144
	c. Belarus-EU Virtual Integration Game.....	148
9.3.4	<i>Forth Presidential Term (2010–2015): First Signs of Democratisation and Effect of the Ukraine’s Crisis on Belarus’ Integration Policy</i> .....	150
	a. Real or Cosmetic Changes in Belarus’ Win-Set? .....	150
	b. Belarus-Russia Integration Game: Business as Usual...	151
	c. Belarus-EU Integration Game: Old Wine in New Bottles? .....	153
9.4	Conclusion.....	155
10.	Ukraine’s Balancing Act Vis-à-Vis the EU and Russia: Integration Policy Dimension.....	158
10.1	International Factors Influencing Ukraine’s Integration Stance .....	158
10.1.1	<i>Costs and Benefits (“Attractiveness”) of Integration Offers to Ukraine</i> .....	158
	a. Attractiveness of Russia’s Integration Offer for Ukraine .....	162
	b. Attractiveness of the EU Integration Offer for Ukraine .	166

10.1.2	<i>Economic Linkages Between Ukraine and External Actors (Trade Flows and Direct Financial Support)</i> .....	174
a.	Ukraine –Russia economic linkages.....	175
b.	Ukraine-EU Economic Linkages .....	180
10.2	<b>Domestic Factors Influencing Integration Stance</b> .....	183
10.2.1	<i>Level-II Political Institutions and Ratification Procedures of International Treaties in Ukraine</i> .....	183
10.2.2	<i>Level-II Political Preferences and Coalitions (Ukraine’s Win-Set)</i> .....	187
a.	Foreign Policy Orientation of Political Elites in Ukraine .....	187
b.	Ukraine’s Parliament and Its Role in the Policy-Making Process.....	191
c.	The Role of Oligarchs in Affecting Ukraine’s Win-Set .	195
d.	Geopolitical Preferences of Ukrainians Towards Integration.....	203
10.2.3	<i>Level-I Negotiator (President), His Strategies and Acceptability Set</i> .....	205
10.3	<b>Analysis of Integration Game in Ukraine Vis-à-Vis Russia and the EU in 1994–2015</b> .....	209
10.3.1	<i>Kuchma Era: Returning to Europe With(Out) Russia?</i> .....	209
10.3.1.1	From Kravchuk to Kuchma I (1994–1999): First Try at Multivector Integration Stance .....	209
a.	Formation and Development of Ukraine’s Win-Set .....	209
b.	“Pick and Choose” Approach in Ukraine’s Integration Game with Russia .....	212
c.	Ukraine-EU Integration Game: Institutional Confusion and European Illusion .....	214
10.3.1.2	Kuchma II (1999–2004): The Rise of Pragmatic Nationalism .....	216
a.	Further Consolidation of the Pragmatic Camp of Eurasianists and Westernizers Shaping Ukraine’s Win-Set .....	216
b.	Ukraine-Russia Integration Game: Battle of Kuchma’s Acceptability Set and Ukraine’s Win-Set.....	219
c.	A Mix of Sticks and Carrots in Ukraine-EU Integration Game.....	223
10.3.2	<i>Yushchenko Era (2005–2010): Ukraine’s Faint Hope of the EU Integration</i> .....	225

a. Transformation of Ukraine’s Win-Set After the Orange Revolution.....	225
b. Ukraine-Russia Zero-Sum Integration Game .....	227
c. Ukraine-EU Integration Game: “the Door Is Neither Open, nor Closed” .....	229
10.3.3 <i>Yanukovich Era (2010–2014): New Game with Old Rules? ....</i>	233
a. Ukraine’s Win-Set: “Everything New Is Actually Well-Forgotten Old” .....	233
b. Ukraine – Russia Integration Game: Back to Old Rules.....	236
c. EU-Ukraine Integration Game: Back to Multi-Vector Integration Stance.....	241
10.3.4 <i>Poroshenko Era (2014–Present): Ukraine’s U-Turn and a Change of Integration Stance to a Pro-European One .....</i>	244
a. Transformation of Ukraine’s Win-Set: Domination of Westernizers? .....	244
b. Ukraine-Russia Integration Game Over .....	246
c. Ukraine-EU Integration Game: Real This Time? .....	248
10.4 Conclusion.....	250
<b>IV. Conclusions.....</b>	<b>253</b>
11. Discussion of the Main Findings.....	253
12. Contributions to Broader Academic Debates and Further Research Agenda.....	273
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>277</b>
<b>Annexes .....</b>	<b>327</b>