

**GENERAL EDITOR: Dr. Anton Shekhovtsov** ----- (anton.shekhovtsov@gmail.com)

## EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Dr. **David Art**

*Tufts University*

Prof. **Kai Arzheimer**

*Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz*

Prof. **Michael Barkun**

*Syracuse University*

Prof. **Tamir Bar-On**

*Monterrey Institute of Technology*

Dr. **Hans-Georg Betz**

*Geneva*

Dr. **Jean-Yves Camus**

*Institute of International and Strategic Relations, Paris*

Prof. **Nigel Copsey**

*Teesside University*

Prof. **Göran Dahl**

*Lund University*

Dr. **Peter Davies**

*University of Huddersfield*

Prof. **Roger Eatwell**

*University of Bath*

Dr. **Matthew Feldman**

*University of Northampton*

Dr. **Tudor Georgescu**

*Oxford Brookes University*

Dr. **Claudia Globisch**

*University of Leipzig*

Dr. **Paul Hainsworth**

*University of Ulster*

Prof. **Aristotle Kallis**

*Lancaster University*

Dr. **Sarah de Lange**

*University of Amsterdam*

Dr. **Marlène Laruelle**

*George Washington University, Washington*

Dr. **Graham Macklin**

*London*

Prof. **Vladimir Malakhov**

*Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences*

Dr. **Andrea Mammone**

*Kingston University, London*

Dr. **George Michael**

*Air War College, Maxwell AFB*

Prof. **David Ohana**

*Ben-Gurion University of the Negev*

Dr. **Rafal Pankowski**

*Collegium Civitas, Warsaw*

Dr. **Ami Pedahzur**

*University of Texas*

Dr. **Valentin Săndulescu**

*Bucharest*

Prof. **Mark Sedgwick**

*Aarhus University*

Dr. **Andreas Umland**

*National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy*

Prof. **Fabian Virchow**

*University of Applied Sciences, Düsseldorf*

Dr. **Michelle Hale Williams**

*University of West Florida*

## ADVISORY BOARD

Prof. **Jocelyn Evans**

*University of Salford*

Prof. **Wouter van der Brug**

*University of Amsterdam*

Prof. **Meindert Fennema**

*University of Amsterdam*

**Gerry Gable**

*Searchlight Magazine*

Prof. **Roger Griffin**

*Oxford Brookes University*

Prof. **Constantin Iordachi**

*Central European University*

Prof. **Andres Kasekamp**

*University of Tartu*

Prof. **Bert Klendermans**

*Free University of Amsterdam*

Prof. em. **Stanley G. Payne**

*University of Wisconsin-Madison*

Prof. **Sabrina P. Ramet**

*Norwegian University of Science and Technology*

Prof. **James Shields**

*Aston University*

Prof. **Ruth Wodak**

*Lancaster University*

# Explorations of the Far Right

edited by Anton Shekhovtsov

ISSN 2192-7448

- 1 *Антон Шеховцов*  
Новые праворадикальные партии в европейских демократиях  
причины электоральной поддержки  
ISBN 978-3-8382-0180-1
  
- 2 *Florian Ferger*  
Tschechische Neonazis  
Ursachen rechter Einstellungen und faschistische Semantiken  
in Zeiten schnellen sozialen Wandels  
ISBN 978-3-8382-0275-4
  
- 3 *Matthew Feldman, Paul Jackson (eds.)*  
Doublespeak  
The Rhetoric of the Far Right since 1945  
ISBN 978-3-8382-0554-0
  
- 4 *Alina Polyakova*  
The Dark Side of European Integration  
Social Foundations and Cultural Determinants of the Rise of Radical Right  
Movements in Contemporary Europe  
ISBN Paperback edition 978-3-8382-0766-7  
ISBN Hardcover edition: 978-3-8382-0816-9

*Alina Polyakova*

# **THE DARK SIDE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

Social Foundations and Cultural Determinants  
of the Rise of Radical Right Movements  
in Contemporary Europe

*ibidem*-Verlag  
Stuttgart

## **Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek**

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

## **Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek**

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

Cover pictures (left to right):

© Thomas Prenner / CC BY 2.0 (s. <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en> / via Wikimedia Commons);

© Superbass / CC-BY-SA-4.0 (s. <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en> / via Wikimedia Commons);

Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain;

Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain;

© Steve Jurvetson / CC BY 2.0 (s. <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en> / via Wikimedia Commons);

© Heurtelions / CC BY-SA 3.0 /s. <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en> / via Wikimedia Commons).

∞

Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem, säurefreiem Papier  
Printed on acid-free paper

ISSN: 2192-7448

ISBN-13 Paperback edition: 978-3-8382-0766-7

ISBN-13 Hardcover edition: 978-3-8382-0816-9

© *ibidem*-Verlag  
Stuttgart 2015

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und elektronische Speicherformen sowie die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronical, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

Printed in Germany

*For my parents,  
Naum Brodsky and Irina Polyakova*

# Table of Contents

<b>List of Tables and Figures</b>	8
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	9
<b>Chapter 1: Introduction</b>	11
The Dark Side of Europe	14
The Polanyian Moment	15
Symptoms of a Countermovement?	18
Themes and Roadmap	24
<b>Chapter 2: Radical Right Parties in Western and Eastern Europe</b>	29
Defining the Radical Right	32
The Paradox of the “Backward” East	35
Explanations and Hypotheses	38
Data and Model Design	46
Results	56
Discussion	61
Conclusion	63
<b>Chapter 3: How Right-Wing Mobilization Works on the Ground</b>	67
Explaining Movement Participation	69
The Case: Ukraine’s Radical Right Movement	75
Method and Data	79
Recruitment Strategies in the Nationalist Heartland: Galicia	84
Recruitment Strategies Outside the Heartland: Volyn	92
How and Why They Join: Radical Right Activists	97
Conclusion	105
<b>Chapter 4: Reimagining Political Parties and Social Movements</b>	107
1950s-1960s: From Marxism to Structuralism	108
1970s-1980s: Mobilization Theories	111
1990s-2000s: Collective Action Frames and Contentious Politics	116

Where Are We Now?	121
Where We Are Going: Political Articulation and Field Theories	128
Field Theory of Social Movements and Political Parties	133
Conclusion	146
<b>Chapter 5: Conclusion</b>	<b>149</b>
Summary of Key Findings	149
What Would Polanyi Say?	153
Unintended Consequences of Economic Integration	154
An Ever-Closer Union?	155
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>159</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>179</b>

## List of Tables and Figures

Figure 2.1: Voteshare Received by Radical Right Parties	30
Table 2.1: Radical Right Parties in Western and Eastern Europe	47
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics	53
Table 2.3: Correlations between the Dependent and Independent Variables	54
Table 2.4: Tobit Regressions on Voteshare Received by Radical Right Parties	56
Table 3.1: Percent of the Popular Vote Received by Freedom	82
Table 3.2: Interviews (2009-2012)	82
Figure 4.1: Model of Structural-Functionalist Theories	109
Figure 4.2: Model of Resource Mobilization Theories	112
Figure 4.3: Model of Political Opportunity Theories	116
Figure 4.4: Model of Framing Processes	118
Figure 4.5: Reflection Logic Chains	128
Figure 4.6: Political Fields, the State, and Challenger Movements	140

## Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the support of many colleagues, friends, and institutional funders. I have many people to thank for making this journey possible. The project grew out of my doctoral dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley. My dissertation committee—Neil Fligstein, Dylan Riley, and Jason Wittenberg—deserve my deepest thanks for their patience and encouragement. I also wish to thank several Berkeley faculty members who did not serve in a formal capacity on this project but whose advice on everything from writing style to the big ideas made its completion possible. Victoria Bonnell, Irene Bloemraad, Claude Fischer, Anne Swidler, Christine Trost, and Margaret Weir have my deepest appreciation. Beyond Berkeley, I owe the most gratitude to John Boli, my undergraduate mentor who encouraged me to pursue a doctorate in the first place, and to Christian Joppke at the University of Bern whose support gave me the time to revise the dissertation. Without Anton Shekhovtsov's tireless editing and Andreas Umland's initial suggestion to publish the book as part of the series, this project would have never come to fruition. To these two fellow scholars, I am truly thankful.

This book is made possible by generous financial support from several research institutions. The National Science Foundation (Graduate Research Fellowship); the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) with funds provided by the United States Department of State through the Title VIII Program; the Social Science Research Council (through the Title VIII Eurasia Program Dissertation Development Award); the Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies (BPS); Berkeley's Center for the Study of Social Change Graduate Fellows Training Program; the Berkeley Sociology Department; and the postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Bern, Switzerland, all provided support at key points of the research and writing process.

Last, but certainly not least, any amount of words would be inadequate to express my gratitude and debt to my parents, who overcame unbelievable hardship and insurmountable odds when they emigrated from

the Soviet Union in 1991. Needless to say, I would not be the person that I am today were it not for their bravery, determination, unconditional support, and seemingly limitless energy. Everything that I am is thanks to them.

## Chapter One

### Introduction

It remained only to decide the political shape of the new order that must now  
replace the unrecoverable past.

—Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be  
built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity.

—*The Schuman Declaration*

Ravaged by years of war, mid-twentieth century Europe was a disaster in every meaning of the word. World War II had effectively bankrupted the major European economies. Countless cities in the East and West lay wasted, and the sheer magnitude of human loss—over 60 million killed—left the European continent devastated and its remaining population exhausted. In 1945, an observer standing on the rubble of Berlin, Warsaw, or any other post-war city, would find it difficult to predict what the future could hold. With the past effectively annihilated, a new Europe was bound to take shape, but the type of economic, political, and social order that would arise from those ashes by the end of the twentieth century remained unimaginable in 1945.

If our casual observer were transported from the wasteland of immediate postwar Europe to the Europe of 2014, the economic prosperity of the once ruined central European cities such as Berlin or Warsaw would immediately have shocked her. And if she spent more time there, she would discover even more surprising and once unimaginable changes: our observer, for example, could board a train from Berlin to Rome without ever being asked to show her passport. Passing through Austria and Switzerland, she would not need to be concerned whether she was holding the appropriate documents, and upon arrival in Rome, she could use the same currency she had elsewhere throughout the continent. If she decided to look for a job in Italy, she could start immediately, without needing to obtain a work permit. If she were a well-educated professional, she would find others like her who considered

themselves *Europeans*, just as much or even more so than Germans or Italians. Finally, she would be quite surprised to learn that the Soviet Union, which, in her time, controlled all lands up to the German border, and even half of Berlin, no longer existed, and that most of the once socialist Eastern Bloc republics now constituted a twenty-seven country union, replete with its own supra-national political institutions. The rhetorical device of the postwar observer only goes so far, but it does illustrate the dramatic micro and macro changes that have taken place in Europe in the last seventy years.

Many of these changes—such as the Schengen zone agreement allowing for the free movement of individuals between countries and the common currency of the Euro—have made contemporary Europe feel more like a single country than a collection of once antagonistic nation-states. The European Union, which began as a limited coal and mining partnership, now stretches from Lisbon to Romania. The Balkan states and Turkey are now candidate countries, and, further east, countries such as Ukraine are waiting to sign association agreements. Step-by-step, Europe has become ever more economically and politically interdependent; meanwhile, EU member states have prospered tremendously in the process. Among the EU's most important achievements has been the maintenance of long-term peace on the continent. In recognition of this success, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Nobel Committee 2012). From our 2014 vantage, another world war on Europe's soil is practically unthinkable.

But economic and political interdependence was never the sole goal of European integration to the architects of the EU project. Enshrining the notion of European *social* solidarity, representatives from France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg gathered in 1950 to sign the Schuman Declaration, which laid the groundwork for what would become the European Union. Although economic and political interdependence alone would have been enough to prevent future wars, in the devastating aftermath of World War II, the vision of a new Europe emphasized cultural integration. The Schuman Declaration envisioned an economic and political institutional framework that would eventually engender a cultural and social solidarity throughout Europe. As Jean Monnet, who along with Schuman is known as

one of the founders of the European Union, famously declared in 1952, “We are not forming coalitions of states, we are uniting men.” As Monnet’s vision suggests, New Europe was to be a social union of European citizens grounded in the common historical and philosophical heritage of Enlightenment ideals. It was to be the beacon of democracy and tolerance. And Europe’s common currency, the Euro, was to be more than a medium of exchange: it was to mark a uniquely European identity.<sup>1</sup>

In many ways, the European Union has lived up to this ideal of supra-national solidarity: compared to fifty or even twenty years ago, more Europeans speak foreign languages, spend significant time outside their country, and identify as Europeans (Fligstein 2008; Risse 2010). While these trends do provide some evidence for increasing cultural integration, scholars examining European identity agree that no overarching sense of “Europeanness” has emerged (Fligstein et al. 2012). For every individual that identifies solely as European, there are ten times as many who see themselves in strictly national terms. Residents of Europe continue to identify primarily as German, Italian, or Romanian. In fact, many see the EU as an elitist project, imposed from the top on an unwilling population.

This charge of elitism may stem from the fact that the average European rarely interacts with any of the major EU institutions, such as the European Parliament. Yet, EU politics have become increasingly influential in national politics (Risse 2010). Rather than embracing this influence, many individuals—especially those who do not see themselves as benefitting from the EU project—feel not only disconnected from the EU, but also resentful of its interference in what were once solely national issues. The 2008 economic crisis intensified these sentiments, as national governments—without control over their national currency—were left helpless to abate the crisis. Further, the EU’s highly unpopular austerity policies, pushed through in already hard-hit countries such as Spain, Greece, and Italy, have confirmed the sentiment that EU policies benefit European elites at the expense of the majority. Unevenness—between countries and individuals—thus characterizes New Europe more so than cultural unity.

---

<sup>1</sup> France’s finance minister, Laurent Fabius, upon the introduction of the Euro was quoted in the London *Financial Times*: “Thanks to the Euro, our pockets will soon hold solid evidence of a European identity. We need to build on this, and make the euro more than a currency and Europe more than a territory...” (*Financial Times*, London, July 24, 2000).

## **The Dark Side of Europe**

As Europe, through the EU, has moved toward greater supra-national integration, another side of European identity and politics has emerged. If our time traveler from the immediate postwar period remained in modern day Europe, she would notice that in some of Western Europe's most prosperous economies, such as those in Austria, France, Holland, Italy, and Switzerland, voters support radical right parties in shockingly high numbers. Such political parties advocate for everything that the European Union claims it does not: intolerance toward "non-European" immigrants, stricter border controls, exclusionary social redistribution policies, and, most importantly, preservation of national tradition and culture. At the core of the radical right's ideology is nationalism in its ethnic form (Hainsworth 2008), which "condense[s] the idea of nation into an image of collective homogeneity" (Minkenberg 2002:337). Once considered ephemeral phenomena, radical right parties have become a mainstay in the very countries that are supposed to lead Europe toward the fulfillment of enlightenment ideals. The persistence of these parties and the continued salience of national identities signal that, behind Europe's many exalted achievements, lies a dark side.

This book is about that dark side of Europe. Specifically, I examine how nationalism, as a radical political movement, manifests in contemporary Europe as support for radical right political parties and as a process of political mobilization.<sup>2</sup> Each of the chapters focuses on an aspect of nationalism. The paradox uniting all the chapters is the seeming contradiction between Europe's EU project of cultural integration and the continued salience and perseverance of nationalism as an ideology, a category of belonging, and a political project.

The EU project is unique: no other international pact, treaty, or alliance in modern history has sought to create a supranational union through voluntary inclusion that nonetheless maintains each member state's sovereignty and autonomy. Yet, the EU has state-like aspirations: it has established political institutions, such as a parliament, presidency, and judicial court. It issues currency through a central bank and has created symbols indicative of nation

---

<sup>2</sup> I do not suggest that nationalism is either a homogenous category or a morally negative concept. Increasing salience of national identities, and perhaps even "popular nationalism" (DiMaggio and Bonikowski 2008), is, however, an unintended consequence of the EU integration process, the aim of which was to create supra-national categories of belonging.

states, such as a flag and anthem. Most notably, it has created a new category of belonging: nationals of all member states now carry EU passports. It is likely that, over time, EU institutions and symbols will become increasingly influential. However, cultural unity has not followed this political and economic integration. Nationalism, rather than fading away or being subsumed by supranational processes, has instead gained momentum. The emergence and continued electoral success of radical right parties and continued persistence of national identities confirms this trend. How can social scientists reconcile these contradictory yet interconnected processes of supranational development on the one hand and nationalist persistence and expansion on the other?

### **The Polanyian Moment**

One way to think about the contradictions of supranational development is to consider the relationship between markets and society. In *The Great Transformation* (1944), Karl Polanyi analyzed the societal responses to the implementation of self-regulating markets in nineteenth-century Europe. According to Polanyi, the relationship between markets and society is characterized by what he referred to as a “double movement.”

In the first stage of the movement, there is an attempt from political and economic elites to implement a “pure” liberal, self-regulating market. In contrast to neoclassical economic theory, however, Polanyi argued that unfettered self-regulating markets are an objective impossibility. Markets require the commodification of previously uncommodified resources: primarily, land, labor, and money. Polanyi referred to these three resources as “fictitious commodities” because they are not actual goods produced for the purpose of exchange. Labor and land are particularly central to Polanyi’s analysis because, unlike money, the lives of human beings depend on these resources. When these resources are treated as commodities in a market economy, there are potentially disastrous consequences for both society and the environment. For example, labor markets rely on a pool of “free,” or readily available, workers to provide a renewable and replaceable source of labor for industrial expansion. If states cannot or do not intervene in labor markets to institute social safety nets or to regulate employers’ labor practices, the logic of the market dictates that employers will seek to lower

the costs of labor by either lowering wages or by moving production to where cheaper labor exists, that is, to developing countries. Workers must bear the consequences of unregulated global and industrial development by living in poverty and dealing with unbearable working conditions. This outcome of the commodification of labor has been verified time and again on the national and global scales. A similarly disastrous consequence of unfettered self-regulating markets occurs when land is treated as a market commodity: without intervention, self-regulating markets use land—the basis for human life—as an input for industrial production irrespective of the environmental consequences. Thus, according to Polanyi, self-regulating markets will eventually destroy the very inputs (labor, land) on which they depend, and with it, the social fabric.

For these reasons, Polanyi argued that a self-regulating market is a theoretical utopia. As markets ravage society and nature, people will eventually resist. This resistance to the disembedding of markets from social relations is what Polanyi referred to as the countermovement, or the attempt to re-embed the market into social relations. For Polanyi, self-regulating markets can never exist in their pure form without dire consequences; markets—by their very nature—are embedded in society, the polity, or culture. Extreme attempts to free markets from social relations will eventually result in a protectionist movement that seeks to ensure the continuation of those social relations: the second phase of the double movement.

One of Polanyi's greatest insights is that the protective countermovement can take various forms, depending on whether it comes from the right or the left. In Scandinavian countries, for example, social democracy developed to mitigate the effects of market liberalism following World War I. Later, in the United States, FDR's New Deal attempted to counteract the disastrous social impact of the Great Depression. In Germany and Italy, however, the countermovement came from the right and resulted in inter-war fascism. Both social democracy and fascism were responses that sought to re-embed markets in society. Interestingly, and in contrast to the liberal economic view, Polanyi insisted that the countermovement develops spontaneously, while the imposition of markets is a political project. As he famously put it, "laissez-faire was planned; planning was not" (1944:147).

Polanyi's insights remain applicable today. Specifically, Polanyi's

theoretical framework provides analytical tools for considering the relationship between the EU project and nationalism as a category of identification and political movement. The EU's most impressive accomplishment to date has been the establishment of a unified market. However, while we may refer colloquially to Europe and the EU interchangeably, as Anderson (2009) points out, these are not the same thing. The EU is an economic, political, and cultural project. Some groups have benefitted from this project while others have been left behind. Like any liberal market, the single EU market has increased inequality both between and within countries. It has freed financial capital from regulation by nation states while allowing for the free movement of labor across borders. Further, the single currency has amputated the economic arms of national governments, hindering their respective ability to manage the social costs of economic crisis. For example, during the 2008 financial crisis, nations were forced to implement EU-driven austerity policies that cut deeply into social benefits, such as pensions and unemployment payments. In the interest of saving the financial system, these policies have exacerbated the economic effects of the crisis and have pushed already struggling groups into further destitution. As unemployment soared across Europe, mass anti-EU protests erupted in countries such as Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. In Italy, the ruling government went into crisis, forcing the prime minister to resign, and in Great Britain, where the Euro was never adopted, support for further EU integration plummeted.

With EU member states incorporated into a single economy, nation states lost the ability to protect their populations from volatile market forces. The EU's political and regulatory institutions, such as the European Central Bank and the EU Commission, remain relatively weak in comparison to its economic institutions. (For instance, most measures aimed at regulation are difficult to pass as they require a unanimous vote from all member states). Without national currencies and without control over interest rates, state regulations simply cannot create protective social measures, as was the usual strategy prior to the adoption of the Euro. The volatility of the EU market also affects countries that have not adopted the Euro, simply due to its sheer size and influence. Thus, the institution of the single market and currency means that the protective countermovement cannot come from national governments unless those governments drastically shift their position

toward the EU. If the national government fails to protect its people from the incursion of the market, the countermovement must emerge from society.

### **Symptoms of a Countermovement?**

The question, then, is whether nationalism constitutes a countermovement to the European economic project. Specifically, does the emergence of populist radical right parties and the increasing salience of national identity provide evidence for an emerging protective movement in response to the single European market?

There is some evidence supporting the idea that the emergence of radical parties, initially in Western and then in Eastern Europe, constitutes a backlash to the EU project. Aside from the Greens, radical right parties represent the only new party family to emerge in post-war Western Europe since the 1980s. The first among these parties, the French National Front (FN), gained momentum when the party received 9.5 percent of the vote in the 1986 French parliamentary elections and the party's leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, received 14.4 percent in the 1988 presidential election. Since then, other radical right parties in Western Europe, such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Belgian Flemish Interest Party (VB), the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), and the Italian National Alliance (AN), have succeeded in gaining parliamentary representation and increasing popular support. Scholars initially regarded radical right parties' electoral successes as anomalous or as a result of single issues, but by 2012, radical right parties had become political fixtures in the majority of Western European countries (see Chapter 2). The chronology of the radical right's initial emergence in the 1980s and subsequent rise in the 1990s and 2000s coincides with the increasing economic integration of the EU: the Maastricht Treaty, which established the membership criteria for the EU, was signed in 1993, the Treaty of Lisbon, which consolidated previous agreements, was signed in 2007, and the Euro was introduced in 2000. Additionally, the EU more than doubled in size during this period, from 12 member states in 1990 to 27 in 2010.

In addition to the EU's development and the rise of radical right parties, two other interrelated and wide reaching socio-economic changes took place at the same time in Europe: the end of welfare state expansion in the early