

GENERAL EDITOR: Dr. Anton Shekhovtsov ----- (anton.shekhovtsov@gmail.com)

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Dr. David Art

Tufts University

Prof. Kai Arzheimer

Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz

Prof. Michael Barkun

Syracuse University

Prof. Tamir Bar-On

Monterrey Institute of Technology

Dr. Hans-Georg Betz

Geneva

Dr. Jean-Yves Camus

Institute of International and Strategic Relations, Paris

Prof. Nigel Copsey

Teesside University

Prof. Göran Dahl

Lund University

Dr. Peter Davies

University of Huddersfield

Prof. Roger Eatwell

University of Bath

Dr. Matthew Feldman

University of Northampton

Dr. Tudor Georgescu

Oxford Brookes University

Dr. Claudia Globisch

University of Leipzig

Dr. Paul Hainsworth

University of Ulster

Prof. Aristotle Kallis

Lancaster University

Dr. Sarah de Lange

University of Amsterdam

Dr. Marlène Laruelle

George Washington University, Washington

Dr. Graham Macklin

London

Prof. Vladimir Malakhov

Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences

Dr. Andrea Mammone

Kingston University, London

Dr. George Michael

Air War College, Maxwell AFB

Prof. David Ohana

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Dr. Rafal Pankowski

Collegium Civitas, Warsaw

Dr. Ami Pedahzur

University of Texas

Dr. Valentin Săndulescu

Bucharest

Prof. Mark Sedgwick

Aarhus University

Dr. Andreas Umland

National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

Prof. Fabian Virchow

University of Applied Sciences, Düsseldorf

Dr. Michelle Hale Williams

University of West Florida

ADVISORY BOARD

Prof. Jocelyn Evans

University of Salford

Prof. Wouter van der Brug

University of Amsterdam

Prof. Meindert Fennema

University of Amsterdam

Gerry Gable

Searchlight Magazine

Prof. Roger Griffin

Oxford Brookes University

Prof. Constantin Iordachi

Central European University

Prof. Andres Kasekamp

University of Tartu

Prof. Bert Klendermans

Free University of Amsterdam

Prof. em. Stanley G. Payne

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Prof. Sabrina P. Ramet

Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Prof. James Shields

Aston University

Prof. Ruth Wodak

Lancaster University

Explorations of the Far Right

edited by Anton Shekhovtsov

ISSN 2192-7448

- 1 *Антон Шеховцов*
Новые праворадикальные партии в европейских демократиях
причины электоральной поддержки
ISBN 978-3-8382-0180-1
- 2 *Florian Ferger*
Tschechische Neonazis
Ursachen rechter Einstellungen und faschistische Semantiken
in Zeiten schnellen sozialen Wandels
ISBN 978-3-8382-0275-4
- 3 *Matthew Feldman, Paul Jackson (eds.)*
Doublespeak
The Rhetoric of the Far Right since 1945
ISBN 978-3-8382-0554-0
- 4 *Alina Polyakova*
The Dark Side of European Integration
Social Foundations and Cultural Determinants of the Rise of Radical Right
Movements in Contemporary Europe
ISBN Paperback edition: 978-3-8382-0766-7
ISBN Hardcover edition: 978-3-8382-0816-9
- 5 *John E. Richardson*
British Fascism
A Discourse-Historical Analysis
ISBN 978-3-8382-0491-8
- 6 *Péter Krekó, Attila Juhász*
The Hungarian Far Right
Social Demand, Political Supply,
and International Context
ISBN 978-3-8382-1074-2

Péter Krekó, Attila Juhász

THE HUNGARIAN FAR RIGHT

Social Demand, Political Supply,
and International Context

ibidem-Verlag
Stuttgart

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

Cover picture: © VT at Hungarian Wikipedia. Licensed under CC BY-SA 1.0
(s. <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/1.0/deed.en>)



Supported by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung—Budapest Office



POLITICAL CAPITAL
POLICY RESEARCH & CONSULTING INSTITUTE

∞

Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem, säurefreiem Papier
Printed on acid-free paper

ISSN: 2192-7448

ISBN 978-3-8382-1074-2

© *ibidem*-Verlag
Stuttgart 2017

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und elektronische Speicherformen sowie die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

Printed in the EU

Contents

List of tables and figures	9
Figures	9
Tables	10
Preface	11
Acknowledgments	17
Our approach in the book	19
What are we talking about? The concepts	19
The supply and demand model	25
The support base of far-right parties	31
Supply-side theories	35
Demand for the ideology of the far right in Hungary	39
A tool for measuring social demand for the far right:	
The DEREK index	39
Prejudice and welfare chauvinism	41
Right-wing value orientation	42
Social demand for the far right in Hungary, 2002–2015	46
The assessment of the DEREK	63
Who are Jobbik’s voters?	66
Jobbik’s performance at the polls: Ups and downs	67
Who are Jobbik’s voters?	80
Where do Jobbik’s voters come from?	87
Supply side: Far right on the political field	89
From marginality toward relevance	89
The regime change and the far right:	
Return to the limelight	89
The first attempt at establishing a far-right party	90
The rise and fall of MIÉP	91
The early history of Jobbik	94
2006: The birth of today’s far right in Hungary	97

The pressure from the right to reorganize.....	100
The far right taking a leading role.....	102
Transforming the agenda	104
The communication of the reorganizing far right.....	105
The structural consequences of events in the fall of 2006 ...	109
Crisis of crises: Consolidation of the far right.....	110
Economic crisis	111
Crisis of government—and governance.....	112
The crisis of Roma integration.....	114
The Jobbik-Fidesz relationship.....	116
Fidesz: Transformation from liberalism to national populism	116
Dismantling of liberal democracy and the central field of force	122
Jobbik’s strategic shift: From extreme to mainstream (“cute campaign”).....	127
The interaction between the two parties	133
Jobbik’s worldview.....	135
Intellectual background: Conspiracies everywhere	135
Jobbik’s ideology	138
Jobbik’s symbolic policy	143
Self-definition.....	143
Jobbik’s concept of “nation”.....	144
Jobbik’s concepts of enemy	146
Jobbik’s concept of “state”.....	150
Concept of history and the most important historical symbols	152
Jobbik’s foreign policy	156
Jobbik’s relations with Iran	157
The Eurasia concept and Jobbik’s connections to Russia...	168
European network of pro-Russian parties.....	169
Historical context of Russian-Hungarian relations	172
Current relations between Jobbik and Russia.....	173
Jobbik’s public policy programs.....	177

The “seven chieftains plan”	179
The 60-step program.....	181
Further sectorial programs	183
The place of minorities in the program.....	189
Jobbik’s organizational background	189
The structural division of today’s Hungarian far right.....	189
Jobbik’s organization building and the Guard phenomenon	191
Jobbik’s subcultural background	199
Alternative politics—“Civil character”	199
Alternative media.....	201
Alternative culture.....	203
Appropriation of the “Roma issue”:	
“Taboo-breakers” against “Gypsy crime”	207
The proliferation of the term “Gypsy crime”.....	208
The shifting meaning of the term “Gypsy crime”	211
A short detour: Developments after 2010	217
The politics of speaking out.....	219
Political strategies against the far right	223
Lack of political strategies?	223
The Hungarian strategies (or lack of) from an international perspective	225
The crisis of the media in covering the far right	227
Governmental strategies	230
Possible strategies for the future.....	232
Concluding remarks—Hungary:	
Taken hostage by the far right?	235
Appendix	241
Bibliography.....	247

List of tables and figures

Figures

Figure 1: Structure of the Demand for Right-Wing Extremism index.....	40
Figure 2: DEREK scores in Hungary, 2002–2015.....	46
Figure 3: Public mood and ESSs in Hungary.....	61
Figure 4: Votes cast on Jobbik’s party lists, 2006–2014	69
Figure 5: Territorial dynamics of Jobbik’s electoral success	70
Figure 6: The map of the municipalities taken by Jobbik, 2014	76
Figure 7: The comparison of the results in the Tapolca district, 2014 and 2015	79
Figure 8: An advertisement for police and a Facebook meme of Fidelitas (Fidesz’s youth branch)	126
Figure 9: Official campaign billboards of Jobbik.....	128
Figure 10: Pictures from Gábor Vona’s Facebook page, expressing the new image of the party	130
Figure 11: Support for Fidesz and Jobbik	133
Figure 12: Meme from Jobbik’s Facebook site, showing the dangers of “Islamization”	168
Figure 13: The impact of the Hungarian Guard on the recruitment capacities of Jobbik.....	195
Figure 14: The history of the term “Gypsy crime” in the Hungarian media, 2005–2009. Source: Political Capital’s calculation based on Observer database.....	209
Figure 15: Support for Fidesz-KDNP, Jobbik, 2014–2016 (% , among all adults, IPSOS/ZRI).....	227

Tables

Table 1:	The electoral results and parliamentary mandates of Jobbik, 2010 and 2014	37
Table 2:	DEREX scores in Hungary, 2002–2015.....	47
Table 3:	DEREX and subindex values in the sixth ESS wave (2012)	57
Table 4:	Election results on party lists, 2014.....	68
Table 5:	European parliamentary election results in Hungary (2009/2014)	72
Table 6:	Mobilization rate: national elections (April 6, 2014), versus EU parliamentary election (without votes cast in foreign missions), May 25, 2014 ..	73
Table 7:	Municipality election results: The municipalities of Jobbik, 2010 and 2014	75
Table 8:	The electoral performance of MIÉP, 1994–2014	93
Table 9:	A comparison of liberal and far-right value systems	140

Preface

Hungary has made a lot of headlines in the international media over the last ten years. The reasons for this international interest are two-fold: the Hungarian far right and the illiberal tendencies in the country. Needless to say, the two phenomena are strongly interconnected. In this book, we try to explain why.

In April 2015, an unprecedented event happened in Hungary: during the mid-term parliamentary elections, Jobbik—the Movement for a Better Hungary (*Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*, Jobbik), once the most extreme ultranationalist party in European parliaments, gained its first ever individual mandate, in a district in Tapolca, western Hungary, where previously Viktor Orbán’s governmental party Alliance of Young Democrats (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége*, Fidesz) had enjoyed strong support. This victory was indicative of Jobbik’s spectacular political successes. Jobbik has had a meteoric rise in the last ten years. A political party established in 2003 that barely gained 2 percent votes in 2006 during the parliamentary election collectively with Hungarian Justice and Life Party (*Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja*, MIÉP) gained 15 percent votes in 2009 during the European Parliament (EP) elections and received 17 percent votes a year later during consecutive parliamentary elections. Then, in the 2014 parliamentary elections, Jobbik gained 21 percent of the votes (excluding votes outside Hungary), and in the summer of that year, at the EP elections, Jobbik took over the position of the second largest party—and has continued to hold it since then. Jobbik’s politicians hope that a continuation of this trend will play a major role in the party’s further rise to power.

However, it would be premature to call this prophecy: tensions within Jobbik and policies of a radicalizing Fidesz implementing Jobbik’s program have hindered party support since then. While it seems that Jobbik will remain a major player in the Hungarian political scene, an electoral breakthrough at the 2018 elections will be difficult.

The Hungarian far right is the rule and the exception at the same time: the rule because it fits to the features of the “Populist Zeitgeist”

and because it is an essentially European and Eastern European phenomenon. Its original revisionist, anti-Semitic ideology built on a strong nostalgia toward the 1920s and 1930s, along with its soft irredentist rhetoric and harsh critique of the political transition in 1989–1990, makes it similar to many far-right organizations in the region, from the Bulgarian Attack (*Ataka*) to Marian Kotleba’s People’s Party Our Slovakia (*Ludová strana Naše Slovensko*). The way the party tries to turn more moderate is following European cookbooks. Gábor Vona, the leader of the party since 2006, has done his best in the last four years to moderate the party and bring it to the “mainstream” of the European populist radical right, using recipes from, among others, parties in France and Serbia. The most extreme party of the European scene before Golden Dawn (*Laiós Síndesmos—Chrysí Avgí*) emerged with a strong heritage from the Hungarian fascist movements and gradually became the centrist challenger to an increasingly authoritarian and chauvinist Fidesz from 2013 onward. And this is a completely open move: Gábor Vona openly admitted recently that he “took the spirit of the party” (Vona, 2016a), betraying its original principles, to make a centrist, modern conservative force capable of governing from an extreme one: a real “mature adult” from a rebellious “adolescent.”

As a result of this policy, which leads to a leadership challenge in the party that Vona could overcome, Jobbik can be, in the long run, an exception to the rule (see, for example, Minkenberg, 2015) that radical-right parties in Eastern Europe are more volatile, and have lower life cycles than the mainstream parties. Jobbik can rather become more similar to their Western counterparts in France, Austria, and the Netherlands, for example, parties that are integral parts of the party system for decades. Jobbik became an important part of the political system, a relatively stable middle-size party. And its quick moderation makes it an exception for one more reason as well. The strategy to become a soft, mild centrist party obviously paid off until 2014 and 2015; it became problematic afterward—with the beginning of the refugee crisis. While in most of the European countries—let’s take Austria, Germany, France, Slovakia as examples—radical-right parties could rise at the expense of mainstream governmental parties, in

Hungary the case was the very opposite. Fidesz, with its law-and-order policy steps (e.g., raising a fence on the southern border of Hungary) and strong xenophobic rhetoric (running billboard campaigns against refugees and initiating a referendum against the mandatory refugee allocation mechanism with very harsh anti-Brussels and xenophobic tone) could gain popularity, while Jobbik rather lost support as it could not, and did not want to, exceed Fidesz in radicalism. But the simple fact that right-wing radicalism could become even more mainstream clearly shows that there is massive social demand for it in Hungary.

In this book, overviewing the available literature, but mainly relying on accumulated knowledge and analyses of Political Capital Institute on the subject, we make an attempt to explain the “demand,” or social, and “supply,” or political, factors responsible for the rise and popularity of Jobbik, the leading force of the genuine Hungarian far right after the regime change. When analyzing Jobbik’s policies and politics, we cannot ignore the domestic political context in general and Jobbik’s relations to current governmental party Fidesz in particular: how Fidesz influenced Jobbik and vice versa. We think that the general simplifying explanation that Jobbik pushed Fidesz more to the extreme position is simplifying and misleading. What we can see instead is that the problems with post-transitional Hungary and the general disillusionment from the democratic ideals and Western models and approaches, hand in hand with political opportunism, led to very similar political and policy approaches in both parties. While they definitely had an impact on each other, their direction was not determined by each other. Furthermore, we highlight the international context of the Hungarian far right. Jobbik and Fidesz, political parties with a nationalist, authoritarian approach, a pro-Russian orientation, and strong anti-Western stance, are products of the problematic transformation period that is specific to postcommunist countries. But they are products of a general “populist Zeitgeist” on the West as well, with declining trust in representative and international institutions, politicians, experts, and the mainstream media and rise of politicians such as Heinz-Christian Strache, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, and Donald Trump as a consequence. The rise of this “Populist Internationale,” as Anne

Applebaum calls it, is a consequence of a strong anti-intellectual revolution and deep feelings of a “center-periphery” conflict. This perceived dichotomy behind the resurgence of populist forces all over the world that can manifest itself in many forms (capital vs. countryside, urban vs. rural, elite vs. people) seems to be much more important than the objective socioeconomical status. And this tension is a strong driving force of political conflicts in Hungary as well.

The story of Jobbik and Fidesz will not be told as separate case studies, but as representatives of broader Central European and European trends. Telling their story from this perspective, we will rely on Cas Mudde’s (2007) *pathological normalcy* thesis. Populist radical-right parties such as Jobbik (and increasingly, Fidesz) are not pathologic and extraordinary, but instead the opposite: seemingly pathological manifestations of normal, mainstream political tendencies and attitudes. The radical right is not the opposite of the mainstream. This is a sharp caricature of the mainstream.

In this book, we do not aim to give an extensive overview of the literature on the far right. We only use the existing literature to give a theoretical framework for our investigation. Also, our approach is not entirely value neutral. When talking about players and policies of the far right, we talk about solutions that often openly go against political values and human rights standards, the pillars of Western civilization.. We do think that authoritarian, nationalistic populist rhetoric and policies are posing a threat to liberal democracies and social peace.

We never thought that the far right and their ideology should be banned or silenced. But political forces and rhetoric that aim to capitalize from the sharpened social conflicts need special attention—because they can provoke violence. But making a distinction between the political force and its voters remains important. Voters’ views may differ in many ways from the policies of their party of choice—and this is the case of Jobbik as well. Jobbik’s supporters are often more moderate on many issues than Jobbik party members (Bíró, Boros, and Varga, 2012). For many, Jobbik is like a political Rorschach test on which they can project their disillusionment, political desires, and hopes. Furthermore, voters with extremist attitudes don’t necessarily vote for the far right; they frequently support mainstream parties.

As it is mentioned above Jobbik changed its political and policy stance substantially in the last few years, as parts of a strategy to gravitate towards the mainstream—while we can observe an opposite trend regarding Fidesz. These two trends might highlight the most dynamic tendencies of the last decade in Hungarian domestic politics, causing significant change in voters' attitudes as well. But it also means that analyzing the far-right in Hungary is like shooting to a constantly and quickly moving target. We analyze, for example, Jobbik's political programs and manifestos written in 2010 and 2014, but some of these elements have already been softened and moderated by the party. But we think it is still important to give a retrospective analysis of Jobbik's symbolic politics and policies as well, for two simple reasons. First, they are deeply rooted in the Hungarian nationalist and far-right traditions (e.g. Paksa, 2012), therefore their relevance goes beyond the party. Second, the moderation strategy is mainly coming from the party leader, Gábor Vona. If he is being replaced as the party leadership in the coming years (e.g. as a consequence of worse-than-expected election results), a hardliner can take back the party and bring back the more radical political line. While party positions can change relatively quickly, the traditional ideology of the Hungarian far-right and its topics seem rather eternal.