

General Editor: Andreas Umland,
Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, andreas.umland@ui.se

Commissioning Editor: Max Jakob Horstmann,
London, mjh@ibidem.eu

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE*DOMESTIC & COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Prof. **Ellen Bos**, *Andrássy University of Budapest*
Dr. **Gergana Dimova**, *University of Winchester*
Dr. **Andrey Kazantsev**, *MGIMO (U) MID RF, Moscow*
Prof. **Heiko Pleines**, *University of Bremen*
Prof. **Richard Sakwa**, *University of Kent at Canterbury*
Dr. **Sarah Whitmore**, *Oxford Brookes University*
Dr. **Harald Wydra**, *University of Cambridge*

SOCIETY, CLASS & ETHNICITY

Col. **David Glantz**, *"Journal of Slavic Military Studies"*
Dr. **Marlène Laruelle**, *George Washington University*
Dr. **Stephen Shulman**, *Southern Illinois University*
Prof. **Stefan Troebst**, *University of Leipzig*
POLITICAL ECONOMY & PUBLIC POLICY
Dr. **Andreas Goldthau**, *Central European University*
Dr. **Robert Kravchuk**, *University of North Carolina*
Dr. **David Lane**, *University of Cambridge*
Dr. **Carol Leonard**, *Higher School of Economics, Moscow*
Dr. **Maria Popova**, *McGill University, Montreal*

FOREIGN POLICY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Dr. **Peter Duncan**, *University College London*
Prof. **Andreas Heinemann-Grüder**, *University of Bonn*
Prof. **Gerhard Mangott**, *University of Innsbruck*
Dr. **Diana Schmidt-Pfister**, *University of Konstanz*
Dr. **Lisbeth Tarlow**, *Harvard University, Cambridge*
Dr. **Christian Wipperfürth**, *N-Ost Network, Berlin*
Dr. **William Zimmermann**, *University of Michigan*
HISTORY, CULTURE & THOUGHT
Dr. **Catherine Andreyev**, *University of Oxford*
Prof. **Mark Bassin**, *Södertörn University*
Prof. **Karsten Brüggemann**, *Tallinn University*
Dr. **Alexander Etkind**, *University of Cambridge*
Dr. **Gasan Gusejnov**, *Moscow State University*
Prof. **Leonid Luks**, *Catholic University of Eichstaett*
Dr. **Olga Malinova**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*
Dr. **Richard Mole**, *University College London*
Prof. **Andrei Rogatchevski**, *University of Tromsø*
Dr. **Mark Tauger**, *West Virginia University*

ADVISORY BOARD*

Prof. **Dominique Arel**, *University of Ottawa*
Prof. **Jörg Baberowski**, *Humboldt University of Berlin*
Prof. **Margarita Balmaceda**, *Seton Hall University*
Dr. **John Barber**, *University of Cambridge*
Prof. **Timm Beichelt**, *European University Viadrina*
Dr. **Katrin Boeckh**, *University of Munich*
Prof. em. **Archie Brown**, *University of Oxford*
Dr. **Vyacheslav Bryukhovetsky**, *Kyiv-Mohyla Academy*
Prof. **Timothy Colton**, *Harvard University, Cambridge*
Prof. **Paul D'Anieri**, *University of Florida*
Dr. **Heike Dörrenbächer**, *Friedrich Naumann Foundation*
Dr. **John Dunlop**, *Hoover Institution, Stanford, California*
Dr. **Sabine Fischer**, *SWP, Berlin*
Dr. **Geir Flikke**, *NUPI, Oslo*
Prof. **David Galbreath**, *University of Aberdeen*
Prof. **Alexander Galkin**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*
Prof. **Frank Golczewski**, *University of Hamburg*
Dr. **Nikolas Gvosdev**, *Naval War College, Newport, RI*
Prof. **Mark von Hagen**, *Arizona State University*
Dr. **Guido Hausmann**, *University of Munich*
Prof. **Dale Herspring**, *Kansas State University*
Dr. **Stefani Hoffman**, *Hebrew University of Jerusalem*
Prof. **Mikhail Ilyin**, *MGIMO (U) MID RF, Moscow*
Prof. **Vladimir Kantor**, *Higher School of Economics*
Dr. **Ivan Katchanovski**, *University of Ottawa*
Prof. em. **Andrzej Korbonski**, *University of California*
Dr. **Iris Kempe**, *"Caucasus Analytical Digest"*
Prof. **Herbert Küpper**, *Institut für Ostrecht Regensburg*
Dr. **Rainer Lindner**, *CEEER, Berlin*
Dr. **Vladimir Malakhov**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*

Dr. **Luke March**, *University of Edinburgh*
Prof. **Michael McFaul**, *Stanford University, Palo Alto*
Prof. **Birgit Menzel**, *University of Mainz-Germersheim*
Prof. **Valery Mikhailenko**, *The Urals State University*
Prof. **Emil Pain**, *Higher School of Economics, Moscow*
Dr. **Oleg Podvintsev**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*
Prof. **Olga Popova**, *St. Petersburg State University*
Dr. **Alex Pravda**, *University of Oxford*
Dr. **Erik van Ree**, *University of Amsterdam*
Dr. **Joachim Rogall**, *Robert Bosch Foundation Stuttgart*
Prof. **Peter Rutland**, *Wesleyan University, Middletown*
Prof. **Marat Salikov**, *The Urals State Law Academy*
Dr. **Gwendolyn Sasse**, *University of Oxford*
Prof. **Jutta Scherrer**, *EHESS, Paris*
Prof. **Robert Service**, *University of Oxford*
Mr. **James Sherr**, *RIIA Chatham House London*
Dr. **Oxana Shevel**, *Tufts University, Medford*
Prof. **Eberhard Schneider**, *University of Siegen*
Prof. **Olexander Shnyrkov**, *Shevchenko University, Kyiv*
Prof. **Hans-Henning Schröder**, *SWP, Berlin*
Prof. **Yuri Shapoval**, *Ukrainian Academy of Sciences*
Prof. **Viktor Shnirelman**, *Russian Academy of Sciences*
Dr. **Lisa Sundstrom**, *University of British Columbia*
Dr. **Philip Walters**, *"Religion, State and Society", Oxford*
Prof. **Zenon Wasyliv**, *Ithaca College, New York State*
Dr. **Lucan Way**, *University of Toronto*
Dr. **Markus Wehner**, *"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung"*
Dr. **Andrew Wilson**, *University College London*
Prof. **Jan Zielonka**, *University of Oxford*
Prof. **Andrei Zorin**, *University of Oxford*

* While the Editorial Committee and Advisory Board support the General Editor in the choice and improvement of manuscripts for publication, responsibility for remaining errors and misinterpretations in the series' volumes lies with the books' authors.

Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS)

ISSN 1614-3515

Founded in 2004 and refereed since 2007, SPPS makes available affordable English-, German-, and Russian-language studies on the history of the countries of the former Soviet bloc from the late Tsarist period to today. It publishes between 5 and 20 volumes per year and focuses on issues in transitions to and from democracy such as economic crisis, identity formation, civil society development, and constitutional reform in CEE and the NIS. SPPS also aims to highlight so far understudied themes in East European studies such as right-wing radicalism, religious life, higher education, or human rights protection. The authors and titles of all previously published volumes are listed at the end of this book. For a full description of the series and reviews of its books, see www.ibidem-verlag.de/red/spps.

Editorial correspondence & manuscripts should be sent to: Dr. Andreas Umland, Department of Political Science, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, vul. Voloska 8/5, UA-04070 Kyiv, UKRAINE; andreas.umland@cantab.net

Business correspondence & review copy requests should be sent to: *ibidem* Press, Leuschnerstr. 40, 30457 Hannover, Germany; tel.: +49 511 2622200; fax: +49 511 2622201; spps@ibidem.eu.

Authors, reviewers, referees, and editors for (as well as all other persons sympathetic to) SPPS are invited to join its networks at www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=52638198614
www.linkedin.com/groups?about=&gid=103012
www.xing.com/net/spps-ibidem-verlag/

Recent Volumes

- 250 *Alexander Motyl*
National Questions
Theoretical Reflections on Nations and Nationalism in Eastern Europe
ISBN 978-3-8382-1675-1
- 251 *Marc Dietrich*
A Cosmopolitan Model for Peacebuilding
The Ukrainian Cases of Crimea and the Donbas
ISBN 978-3-8382-1687-4
- 252 *Eduard Baidaus*
An Unsettled Nation
State-Building, Identity, and Separatism in Post-Soviet Moldova
With forewords by John-Paul Himka and David R. Marples
ISBN 978-3-8382-1582-2
- 253 *Igor Okunev, Petr Oskolkov (Eds.)*
Transforming the Administrative Matryoshka
The Reform of Autonomous Okrugs in the Russian Federation, 2003–2008
With a foreword by Vladimir Zorin
ISBN 978-3-8382-1721-5
- 254 *Winfried Schneider-Deters*
Ukraine's Fateful Years 2013–2019
Vol. I: The Popular Uprising in Winter 2013/2014
ISBN 978-3-8382-1725-3
- 255 *Winfried Schneider-Deters*
Ukraine's Fateful Years 2013–2019
Vol. II: The Annexation of Crimea and the War in Donbas
ISBN 978-3-8382-1726-0
- 256 *Robert M. Cutler*
Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policies II
East-West Relations in Europe and the Political Economy of the Communist Bloc, 1971–1991
With a foreword by Roger E. Kanet
ISBN 978-3-8382-1727-7
- 257 *Robert M. Cutler*
Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policies III
East-West Relations in Europe and Eurasia in the Post-Cold War Transition, 1991–2001
With a foreword by Roger E. Kanet
ISBN 978-3-8382-1728-4
- 258 *Pawel Kowal, Iwona Reichardt, Kateryna Pryshchepa (Eds.)*
Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine III
Archival Records and Historical Sources on the 1990 Revolution on Granite
ISBN 978-3-8382-1376-7

Mikhail Minakov (Ed.)

PHILOSOPHY UNCHAINED

Developments in Post-Soviet Philosophical Thought

With a foreword by Christopher Donohue

ibidem
Verlag

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

Cover picture: © Mykhailo Minakov

ISBN-13: 978-3-8382-1768-0

© *ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart 2023

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und elektronische Speicherformen sowie die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

Printed in the EU

Contents

	<i>Chris R. Donohue</i>	
	Foreword. Soviet and Post-Soviet Philosophy: Continuities, Complexities, Unshacklings, and Zombifications	7
	<i>Mikhail Minakov</i>	
	Editor's Introduction. Philosophy Unchained: Introductory Notes on the Post-Soviet Philosophical Condition	17
	<i>Mikhail Minakov</i>	
1	The Soviet Philosophical Condition: Adventures of Philosophy in the Soviet Union.....	21
	<i>Tatiana Shchytsova</i>	
2	Philosophy as a Realistic Utopia: A Personal View on the Emancipation of Philosophy in Post-Soviet Belarus.....	75
	<i>Giorgi Khuroshvili</i>	
3	Philosophy in Independent Georgia.....	101
	<i>Maija Kūle</i>	
4	Latvian Philosophical Developments in the Context of Western Thought	123
	<i>Viktoras Bachmetjevas</i>	
5	Philosophy in Lithuania after 1989	153
	<i>Alexandru Cosmescu</i>	
6	Constructing a Philosophical Voice. Discursive Positions in Moldovan Philosophical Journals	175

	<i>Michail Maiatsky</i>	
7	Contemporary Philosophy in Russia (1991–2022)	211
	<i>Denys Kiryukhin</i>	
8	The Philosophical Process in Post-Soviet Ukraine	283
	<i>Yevgeniy Abdullaev</i>	
9	Philosophy in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan.....	323
	 The Contributors.....	 343
	 Index of Names, Terms, and Titles.....	 349

Foreword

Soviet and Post-Soviet Philosophy Continuities, Complexities, Unshacklings, and Zombifications

Christopher R. Donohue

Soviet philosophy frequently carried with it a note of apology. I. Luppol observed in the third edition of his widely known “Lenin and Philosophy” that Lenin was “not the author of many philosophical treatises” as he was not an “armchair academic who forever and exclusively buried himself in books, finding his own little world in them” (Luppol 1930: 12). This was because for Luppol (discussed by Mikhail Minakov in this volume), Lenin was “not a theoretician for the sake of theory” (Luppol: *ibid.*). At the same time, as was equally well-known, Marx had a high claim for philosophy. Marx wrote in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction* that not only did philosophy become *concrete* in the proletariat, but also that philosophy *itself* was the *spiritual* weapon of the proletariat. Philosophy, rather highly and abstractly, is part and whole, end and beginning.

Likewise, as Hannah Arendt underscored in her brilliant, though sadly unfinished analyses of Marx and Marxism, that both were revolutionary and immensely important. She wrote that the real break of Marx was in his denial of the tradition, which ranked thinking higher than action – a position that stretched back to Plato. As Arendt noted, thinkers prior to Marx had firmly committed to the idea that the only function of politics was to “make possible” and “safeguard” the life of contemplation, which viewed the withdrawal from the world as the *summum bonum* (Arendt 2009: 76). Philosophy, though of dire importance to Marxist and Soviet thought, was at the same time undernourished due to the emphasis on politics, and on action more broadly, its own *praxis*.

At the same time, Marxist, Soviet and now post-Soviet philosophy has continually suffered from the assumption that philosophy (and arts and letters more generally) in Russia and in Eastern Europe, were the consequence of an overwrought interpretation of “Western” ideas such as the Enlightenment philosophies of man and of the state, of Romanticism, of varieties of socialism and communism. And because of the so-called “Russian character” and uneven and haphazard modes of institutional, intellectual, and social development in Russia and Eastern Europe, these ideas caused irresolvable conflicts with the *Old Regime*. Martin Malia epitomized a generation of work in Russian and European intellectual history by underscoring the great receptivity of Russians in Herzen and Tolstoy’s eras to Western European ideas—whether to Spinoza, Diderot, Babeuf, Proudhon, Hegel, the natural and biological sciences, Darwinian theory, and Mendelian genetics. Such receptivity, due to the fragility of state and social institutions, led to radicalism, accelerationism, and finally, cataclysm (Todes 1989; Vucinich 1963; Malia 1995: 65).

Soviet and now post-Soviet philosophy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic States, was then a constant series of negotiations with Marx and Marxist theory, revealing significant breaks because of revolutions and the violent strictures of Stalinist totalitarian rule. As importantly, the end of the Communist system in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic States was indeed another break and signified both an unshackling of philosophy from Soviet strictures as well as an embrace of a specific strand of the liberal tradition, spanning from John Stewart Mill, Mary Wollstonecraft to Walter Bagehot to Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper and Friedrich von Hayek. Nevertheless, one sees in many writings and political reconfigurations today, some essential continuities.

The role of Marxism and Soviet philosophy, then, both during and after Communist governance, reveals itself to be both self and other. Authors working in Russia under the Soviet system in biology and genetics, and against both European and American justifications of eugenics and of scientific racism, such as the anthropologist M. Volockoj (1893–1944), reveal a complex series of

negotiations and adjustments to the Soviet philosophical condition. Volockoj's own complex alignment of eugenics with the Marxist orthodoxy illustrated various elements of "mimicry" of "good philosophy," strenuous efforts to introduce ideas which worked against many of the fundamental tenants of Marxist practice (such as a reduction of man to the genetic and to the biological), and an intensive jousting with its subject matter. Volockoj underscored in his *The System of Eugenics as a Biosocial Discipline* that not enough was known in genetics to "eliminate the root causes of hereditary diseases" through eugenic measures (Volockoj 1928: 18). On the other hand, he also argued that eugenic measures, such as "sterilization, prohibition of marriage, (and) segregation" were among the only methods possible for the "protection the interests of offspring" (Volockoj 1928: 19). Much the same rhetoric was used many years earlier by one of the main proponents of the Czech eugenic movement Jaroslav Kříženecký "Youth Protection and Eugenics" (*Ochrana mládeže a eugenika*), published in 1916.

At the same time, Volockoj also complained, hewing closer to the Marxist orthodoxy, that ideas about positive eugenics (or efforts to increase the population of the so-called "fit," as opposed to methods such as sterilization which eliminated the so-called "unfit") were much like the complaints of Tolstoy and Pushkin about the "mass of mediocrity" (Volockoj 1928: 21). More 'orthodox' for the ideological times was Volockoj's insistence that any system of eugenics needs to account for the "the role of the evolution of socio-economic relations" (Volockoj 1928: 16). Although the biological features of the organism may be immutable, according to Volockoj, as capitalism gave way to "higher social forms" and to communism, this would change the very nature of values and of social competition. The "fangs" (*klyki*) which were so useful in the formerly capitalist world will be nothing but a "shameful ballast" in the new communist system, where there will be an inversion of not only capitalist values but the very social structure itself (Volockoj 1928: 30).

Another illustrative text, a Russian translation of the genetic epidemiologist James Neel's *Human Heredity* with an introduction by the geneticist S. N. Ardashnikov in 1958 saw the return of a kind

of scientific and ideological pluralism to the Soviet philosophical condition after Stalin. Ardashnikov underscored that the book was the “best of its kind” as it relates to human genetics and questions relating to human heredity, as well as the connections between genetics and environment. Nevertheless, he cautioned the reader as to Neel’s extensive discussions of eugenics. Ardashnikov detailed how Neel’s even moderate support of some forms of eugenics was “incompatible with our ideas.” Such eugenic ideas, Ardashnikov’s noted, supported “racism” and “colonial wars.” Ardashnikov was, importantly, correct on this. For Ardashnikov, as well, Neel’s own support of eugenics, furthermore, was illustrative for the Russian reader of the support of so-called “progressive” “Western” scientists of eugenics. Ardashnikov gave then the readers his support of the latest research in genetics, the environment, and their connection to disease, along with a categorical rejection (rightly!) of eugenics as racist, colonialist, and disturbingly accepted by many geneticists in the “West” (Neel 1958: 5–6).

And as I argue in my in-preparation work on genetics, politics, and the use of various Marxisms as a philosophical substratum in eastern Europe after World War II, the consequences of the Marxist orthodoxies were enormous and generational. Without the “Marxist humanism” of Tito’s Yugoslavia and the *Praxis* school we would not have the singularly Spenglerian reactionary Marxism of Serbian philosopher Mihailo Marković, whose 1964 *Man and Technics* (*Čovek i tehnika*) contains the roots of Marković’s virulent biological ethnonationalism, beginning in the 1980s. Nor today, without the memories and weaponized legacy of that regime, would there be the figure of Tomislav Sunić of the “New European Right” spreading conspiratorial and genocidal theories concerning how “multicultural and multiracial states...lead to civil wars” or how the communistic “new class” caused a “negative sociobiological selection” which directly led the breakup of the state of Yugoslavia (“Kresimir” 2018).

Nor would there be, without Marxism and the Soviet philosophical condition, the work of family sociologist Walenty Majdański bemoaning the “marriages” of “bourgeoisie” and of “workers” as “childless” and “comfortable-consumable.”

Writing in 1947 with the imprimatur of the Catholic Church in Poland in *The Family Against the Coming Epoch*, Majdański vociferously inveighed against what he called “rationalizing children” as well as the “rationalization of children” (Majdański 1947: 5) By this he meant a kind of an “insane” “autonomy” where “marriages may not have enough children for a nation to exist.” Nations, further, with not enough children, according to Majdański, will die out, most likely from attacks from external enemies (Majdański 1947:8) Majdański, calling for “new moral forces,” (ibid.: 6) stridently inveighed against “autonomy” without “healthy morality.” Otherwise, he continued, without morality the increase in autonomy would lead to “anarchy.” Such a state was already occurring, he argued, in Europe and in the United States (ibid.: 7)

For him, a true “revolutionary” and “citizen” was an individual who led a life which is “knowingly faithful to nature” and a “healthy married life.” Any other “revolutionaries” or “citizens” for Majdański were dying out like the “bison” of the American West, or “parasites.” For him, the most important “struggle” for the Polish nation was that for the “healthy family life” which was the “basis for the existences of classes and nations.” For Majdański finally there was no future either for the proletariat (or by extension for the Communist form of government). For him, the modern-day “workers”, the modern-day proletariat were very much unlike the old Roman variety, of a “poor man with many children.” Rather it “can be said that the proletarians are dying out today as the aristocracy once did” (ibid: 10).

Majdański’s writings have a startling contemporaneity to them. Though working under and very much against the Marxist orthodoxy and in Communist Poland, one could very easily imagine the exact same arguments made by Viktor Orban in Hungary today. Particularly striking is Majdański’s juxtaposition of Poland with “Europe” and “America”, his themes of internal and external enemies besetting the nation, and his call for “new moral forces.” For Majdański, both Europe and America had “autonomy” without “values” and as such were in “anarchy.” His was a critique both of liberty and of individualism outside of traditional

moralism. His biological othering of his opponents as “bison” and as “dying out and extinct” (ibid:11) both declining in number and at the same time decimating the body politic “consciously dying” “diametrically different, ” from “a completely different world” (ibid: 11), not only brings to mind the virulent Nazi German eliminationist antisemitism of the 1930s and 1940s, but also closely parallels the biological othering of political and other opponents by Orban, Sunić and other leaders of the new European right. The demodernization of American political discourse, which began with Donald Trump’s rise to political prominence in 2016, may well have reached a new and dangerous stage with a significant section of the Republican party becoming an extension of Orbanism in mid-2022 (see most recently: Borger & Garamvolgyi 2020)

As important, the continued study of Soviet philosophy and its post-Soviet legacies is newly necessary because of the essential parallels between reactionary thought under Communism and the reactionary populism that emerged from after its dissolution. Tomislav Sunić draws frequent parallels between what he calls “Homo sovieticus” and the post-Soviet “Homo americanus.” Sunić, as part of his Social Darwinist identitarianism, argues that while it appears that both ideologies, epistemologies, ways of being were fundamentally opposed, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, similarities between the two have begun to emerge. According to Sunić, both American and Soviet variants were “anchored to the same egalitarian foundations.” Like his Soviet counterpart, the American version became “a global kind” whose morals, ideals and values circulated far beyond the territorial borders of America or of the Soviet Union. Last, Sunić contends that America’s egalitarianism and openness to “the ever-increasing demands of non-European newcomers” will eventually lead to a leveling of society and a kind of “proto-communism” (Sunic 2019). Much like Orban and Vladimir Putin now, Sunić underscored that post-Communist Eastern Europe should promote values that were antithetical to the “West” because the denizens of Eastern Europe were characterologically different from their “Western” European counterparts. Sunić spat that, “Liberal global illusions of ‘equal

rights' trigger today great neurosis among the youth of Eastern Europe" (Sunic 1997).

Almost forty years ago, Jeffrey Herf, in his brilliant *Reactionary Modernism*, outlined the history of "Americanism" and its importance to the German far-right. According to Herf, "Americanism meant consumerism, mass culture, Taylorism, and liberalism." Such a combination of hatreds animated the work of figures throughout the 20th century, from Oswald Spengler to Mihailo Marković (Herf 1984: 87). Herf notes elsewhere that *Amerikanismus*, for far-right intellectuals and their circles was a "plague threatening the German soul" (ibid: 41). Herf's insight about Americanism, combined with the falsification that technology in the twentieth century is so pervasive as having no subject, object or remedy, is generalizable to a significant amount of anti-liberal thought after WWII.

Identitarian, Social Darwinian figures like Sunić and Viktor Orban approach America and Europe, its *liberalizmus* and *globalizmus*, as recurrences and reincarnations of *szovjetizmus*, if not the actual Soviet system itself. They do this while living in a physical, geospatial reality where the Soviet state is no more, and Marxism—outside of a few instances—is a historical ideology in Europe. Here Orban's account of the EU "rule of law" as a Soviet return is particularly illustrative.

For far-right populists today, the Soviet past and its Marxist ideology is the actual present, where there can be proclamations from the Hungarian government about the "great replacement" of "Europeans" by "non-European migrants" along the very lines which caused Majdański to bemoan the "dying out of the proletariat" like the aristocracy of old. Reactionary ideology and reactionary politics both under Communism and after, is about numbers. Numbers of children, of "Poles", "Hungarians" against the "suicidal policy in the Western world" (Beauchamp 2022).

Anticommunism and anti-Marxism have become, for a generation of populist strongmen and "intellectuals," anti-Europeanism, anti-Americanism and "anti-West-ism." Such a transformation is to be expected because anti-Communism under the regime was for many conservative dissidents anti-Europeanism

and anti-Westernism. And not just in the work of Majdański, but in the writings of Mihailo Marković. In the case of the latter, there is a plausible case that even Marxist “humanism,” through its account of technological alienation and its critique of America and “the West,” was an incubator of sorts for his later ethnonationalism.

The weaponized image of Marxism and the Soviet system as “egalitarian” and “multicultural” allows contemporary populists not only in Eastern Europe, but also France and the United States, to use Soviet memory and “undead” Soviet ideology as a kind of free-floating ideological vector. It functions for them at the same time as the “true face” of America and the European Union.

The Soviet past that will not become past is thus a continual sustenance to populists in ways that are barely understood. Thus, the complexity of Soviet philosophy and its post-Soviet iterations is essential for even scholars in “Western” Europe and America. And not only its manifestations but its *zombification* in the hands of the global far right today. Such a *zombification* has begun to influence liberal democracies all over the world, but none more so than the United States.

Bibliography

- Arendt, H. (2009). *The Promise of Politics*. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
- Beauchamp, Z. (2022). The European country where “replacement theory” reigns supreme.” *Vox*, May 19, <https://www.vox.com/2022/5/19/23123050/hungary-cpac-2022-replacement-theory> (accessed June 11, 2022).
- Borger, J., Garamvolgyi, F. (2022). Trump shares CPAC Hungary platform with notorious racist and antisemite. *The Guardian*, May 21, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/21/trump-shares-cpac-hungary-platform-racist-antisemite> (accessed June 11, 2022).
- Herf, J. (1984) *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*. New York: Cambridge University Press.